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This study presents the evolution of the quality of corporate governance practices of listed 
Brazilian companies from 2004 to 2013 by means of a broad corporate governance index 
(CGI). Results indicate that the quality of corporate governance practices improved, 
notably after the creation of voluntary membership exchange trading lists that require 
better corporate governance and disclosure practices. The average CGI score of 5.8 (out 
of 10.0) in 2013 may be considered low and points to the need for further improvement. 
Moreover, firms score very low in the ethics & conflicts of interest aspects of the CGI, when 
compared to its disclosure, board composition & functioning, and shareholders rights 
components. The very small number of firms that ban loans to related parties and that 
facilitate participation in the shareholder meetings is a concern. The decrease in the use of 
control enhancement mechanisms, such as non-voting shares and indirect control 
structures, was a remarkable achievement. Even so, shareholder agreements are 
increasingly used as instruments to interfere with director independence and leverage the 
controlling bloc power.  
Keywords: corporate governance index, conflicts of interest, board of directors, disclosure, 
shareholder rights, Brazil 
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Este estudo apresenta a evolução da qualidade das práticas de governança corporativa 
de empresas brasileiras negociadas em bolsa entre 2004 e 2013 por meio de um índice 
abrangente de governança corporativa (CGI). Os resultados indicam que a qualidade das 
práticas de governança corporativa melhorou, especialmente após a criação dos níveis 
diferenciados de governança corporativa de adesão voluntária na bolsa, que exigem 
práticas melhores de governança corporativa e transparência. O CGI médio de 5,8 (em 
um total de 10) em 2013 pode ser considerado baixo e sugere que pode haver mais 
espaço para melhoria. Além disso, as empresas pontuam muito baixo nos aspectos de 
ética & conflito de interesse do CGI, quando comparadas com os componentes sobre 
transparência, composição & funcionamento do conselho e diretos dos acionistas. O 
número muito pequeno de empresas que proíbem empréstimos a partes relacionadas e 
que facilitam a participação nas assembleias de acionistas é uma preocupação. A 
diminuição de mecanismos de aumento do controle, como as ações sem direito de voto e 
estruturas indiretas de controle, foi um avanço notável. Mesmo assim, os acordos de 
acionistas são cada vez mais empregados como instrumentos que interferem com a 
independência dos conselheiros e aumentam o poder do bloco controlador.  
Palavras-chaves: índice de governança corporativa, conflitos de interesse, conselho de 
administração, transparência, direitos dos acionistas, Brasil 
 
1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance encompasses many aspects, such as the ownership and 
control structure (SHLEIFER and VISHNY, 1997; LA PORTA et al., 1998, 1999; 
CLAESSENS et al., 2000, 2002), takeover defenses (SCHWERT, 2000; FIELD and 
KARPOFF, 2002), executive compensation (BRICK et al., 2006; ADAMS and FERREIRA, 
2008), and board size and composition (HERMALIN and WEISBACH, 1991; YERMACK, 
1996; EISENBERG, SUNDGREN, and WELLS, 1998). These governance mechanisms can 
be adopted simultaneously or alternatively. Many international studies used broad firm-
level governance indexes to measure the quality of corporate governance practices based 
on these aspects (KLAPPER and LOVE, 2004; DROBETZ, SCHILLHOFER, and 
ZIMMERMANN, 2004; BHAGAT and BOLTON, 2008; BLACK, CARVALHO, and 
GORGA, 2012).  
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There have been many initiatives to improve corporate governance practices and 
investor protection in Brazil. The “New Law of Corporations”, Law 10,303 of 31 October 
2001, and the Brazilian Securities Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, CVM) 
Instruction 480 of 7 December 2009, which introduced the Reference Form (Formulário 
de Referência or FR) with many additional and more detailed disclosure requirements, are 
two very important recent pieces of regulation. The Code of Best Practices produced by the 
Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC) and the “Corporate Governance 
Recommendations” advanced by CVM are two compilations of recommended best 
practices, even so, there is no "comply or explain" requirement in Brazil. The Securities, 
Merchandise, and Futures Exchange of Brazil (BM&FBovespa) introduced three premium 
segments in 2000. Companies join them voluntarily and commit to comply with their 
corporate governance and disclosure listing requirements. The three premium lists are 
called Level 1, Level 2, and Novo Mercado, with increasingly more demanding corporate 
governance and disclosure requirements. Leal (2011) provides more details about these 
initiatives and Carvalho and Pennacchi (2011) offer more on the premium listing 
segments.  
The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of a broad corporate 
governance index (CGI) that provides a comprehensive description of firm-level corporate 
governance practices of Brazilian firms from 2004 to 2013. The index is a score derived 
from publicly available company information used to answer questions in a questionnaire. 
The questionnaire includes questions on the aforementioned corporate governance 
aspects. Leal and Carvalhal (2005, 2007) designed the first versions of the CGI 
questionnaire with 15 and 24 questions, respectively, in a project sponsored by the Inter-
American Development Bank in 2003. After 2004, the IBGC has been sponsoring the 
annual collection of the CGI to promote better corporate governance practices in Brazil. 
The IBGC sponsored questionnaire introduced in 2004 has 20 questions. We have used 
this later version of the questionnaire to compute the CGI score in Carvalhal and 
Subrahmanyam (2007), Leal et al. (2009, 2010), Carvalhal and Nobili (2011), Carvalhal 
(2012), and Barros et al. (2015).  
Our contribution in this article is to offer a portrait and discussion about the 
evolution of the Brazilian corporate governance practices of listed companies captured in 
the 2004 version of the CGI. We take stock of an important decade for Brazilian 
corporate governance practices, since the listing of the first IPO in Novo Mercado in 
2004, through the IPO wave of 2004-2007, and the international crises years in the 
remainder of the sample. We point out what improved and what still requires more 
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corporate effort. As a by-product, the article offers many citations of the recent Brazilian 
literature on the topic.  
This article is closely related to Black, Carvalho, and Sampaio (2014) who present 
the evolution of their survey sample questionnaire for the years 2004, 2006, and 2009. 
Their results stem from a more limited sample in terms of the number of firms and years 
surveyed because they employ a survey and depend on company responses. They do not 
obtain all of their answers from publicly available information. On the other hand, they are 
able to offer more details on some aspects of Brazilian corporate governance practices 
than we do. Silveira, Barros e Famá (2006) and Silveira and Barros (2008) present 2002 
results from a similar score developed independently by professor Alexandre di Miceli da 
Silveira around the same time. Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005, 2007) provide details 
on a 15-question questionnaire for the 1998-2002 period and for a 24-question 
questionnaire for 1998, 2000, and 2002, which were earlier versions of the CGI.  
The article is structured as follows. The next section describes the CGI and the 
methodology used to obtain the index. Section 3 describes our sample. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results about the evolution of the CGI from 2004 to 2013. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2 – A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES INDEX FOR BRAZIL 
 
The use of broad firm-level corporate governance indices has become common in 
the international literature (KLAPPER and LOVE, 2004; DROBETZ et al., 2004; BHAGAT 
and BOLTON, 2008; BLACK et al., 2012). In 2003, two of the authors developed an 
initial version of the corporate governance index (CGI) as a by-product of a project 
sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank (LEAL and CARVALHAL, 2005, 2007). 
The IBGC has supported the calculation of the CGI since 2004. The earlier version of the 
CGI was based on 24-question questionnaire. The IBGC-sponsored CGI contains 20 
questions that resulted from a revision of the initial questionnaire and was validated by 
corporate professionals and IBGC staff.  
The current CGI has 20 questions. They cover four broad dimensions: disclosure; 
board composition & functioning; ethics & conflicts of interest; and shareholder rights. 
These dimensions may be somewhat arbitrary but are helpful for presentation purposes. 
Each question has a “yes” or “no” answer. The question scores 1 if the answer is “yes”, 
otherwise the score is 0. We also score 0.5 to differentiate companies that adopt certain 
corporate governance practices partially in some questions. The index is the simple sum of 
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the scores for each question. There is no weighing among questions. The maximum index 
value is 20. The CGI score is drawn from public information disclosed by listed firms, such 
as company filings, their FRs (the standard form for CVM filings since 2009), charters, and 
annual reports. We collect the data from the websites of the company, CVM, and 
BM&FBovespa. Table 1 shows the CGI questions and the criteria used to answer them. 
The questions are based on good corporate governance practices according to 
international standards and recommendations of IBGC, CVM, and BM&FBovespa.  
The use of an objective index to measure corporate governance practices avoids 
the biases present in subjective qualitative interviews or surveys. Those that volunteer to 
answer them may be the ones with the best answers. The reply rates of surveys and 
interviews may be low, rendering their representativeness questionable. The most important 
limitation of our objective approach is that we cannot ask everything we would like 
because we rely on public information availability to obtain our answers. Another limitation 
is that we cannot capture the nuances that transpire in interviews or surveys. The remainder 
of this section provides a brief review of the literature associated with each of the four 
dimensions used for grouping questions.  
 
Table 1 - Corporate Governance Index Questions Applied to Brazilian Companies 
Each question corresponds to a “yes” or “no” answer. If the answer is “yes”, then the value of 1 (or 0.5) is 
attributed to the question, otherwise the value is 0. The index is the sum of the points for each question. 
Index dimensions are simply for presentation purposes and there is no weighing among questions. All 
questions are answered from public information (company filings, charters, and annual reports).  
Question Answering Procedure and Scoring Criteria 
Disclosure 
1. Does any company public document include 
information about policies and established 
mechanisms to handle conflict of interest 
situations and/or related party transactions?  
Verify the FR, code of ethics or conduct, and corporate charter. 
The score is: 0 if the company does not disclose this 
information; 0.5 if the company discloses something about this 
information; 1 if the company discloses substantial 
information. 
2. Does the company disclose compensation 
information for senior management and board 
members, separating the amounts paid to 
management and board, and the variable and 
fixed proportions?  
Verify item 13 of FR. The score is: 0 if the company does not 
separate board and management and fixed and variable 
compensation; 0.5 if it separates board and management or 
fixed or variable; 1 if it separates board and management and 
fixed and variable. 
3. Did the company present any opinion in the 
independent auditor report in the last five years 
that was not unqualified?  
Verify explanatory notes in the financial statements. The score 
is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
4. Does the company website have an investor 
relations section containing its Annual Report? 
The document must be clearly identified as the Annual Report 
from the previous year, must be in the Investors Relations area, 
and cannot be the Management Report, required by CVM. The 
score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
5. Does the company website contain the 
presentations made to securities analysts?  
Presentations must refer, at least, to the last quarter of the 
previous year or previous year. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 




6. Does the Annual Report include a specific 
section dedicated to the implementation of 
corporate governance principles?  
Verify the Annual Report and website. The information must be 
substantial and not simply descriptive of board membership 
and ownership structure. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if 
answer is yes. 
Board Composition and Functioning 
7. Are the Board of Directors Chair and the 
CEO different persons?  
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
8. Does the company have board committees 
reported in public information such as the 
corporate charter, annual report, website, FR?  
Financial institutions must have an audit committee to comply 
with Central Bank regulation and those do not count for a 
positive score. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is 
yes. 
9. Is the board only made up of outside 
directors, with the exception of the CEO?  
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if there are other managers in 
addition to the CEO; 1 otherwise. Changed in 2014 to: The 
score is: 0 if there are managers including the CEO; 1 
otherwise.  
10. Is the board size between 5 and 11 
members, as recommended by the IBGC Code 
of Best Practices?  
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
11. Do board members serve consecutive one 
or two-year terms, as recommended by the 
IBGC Code of Best Practices?  
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
Ethics and Conflicts of Interest 
12. Is the percentage of non-voting shares in 
total capital less than 20%?  
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
13. Is the percentage of voting shares of the 
controlling block equal or less than its 
percentage of all kinds of shares altogether?  
Verify the company charter and shareholders agreement. The 
score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
14. Are loans to the controlling shareholder or 
other related parties prohibited in the company 
charter or shareholders agreement? 
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
15. Does the corporate charter facilitate 
shareholder participation in general meetings by 
not requiring the previous remittance of 
documentation proving the shareholder status 
and adopting the principle of good faith?   
Verify the company charter. The score is: 0 if the company 
requires both the previous remittance of documentation 
proving the shareholder status and does not adopt the 
principle of good faith; 0.5 if it either requires the previous 
remittance of documentation proving the shareholder status or 
does not adopt the principle of good faith; 1 if answer is yes. 
Shareholders Rights 
16. At least one of the affirmatives below is 
true: 
a) the company concedes one vote to each 
share, of any kind 
b) the company concedes the right to vote to 
non-voting shares in greater impact decisions 
Verify the company charter. The score is: 0 if non-voting shares 
never vote; 0.5 the company concedes the right to vote to 
non-voting shares in greater impact decisions or if the 
company has only voting shares but presents voting limits per 
shareholder or golden shares; 1 if it abides to the one share, 
one vote, principle.   
17. Does the company grant mandatory bid 
rights besides what is legally required?  
The score is: 0 if no rights besides the legal rights are granted; 
0.5 the company extend extra mandatory bid rights to either 
voting or non-voting shares, but not both; 1 the company 
extend extra mandatory bid rights to both voting and non-
voting shares, if any.  
18. Is the company control direct? 
The score is: 1 if the direct controlling shareholder is an 
individual, institutional investor, foreign entity, the state, or a 
fully owned holding company of one of the previous owner 




19. Do shareholders agreements abstain from 
directing or constraining the right to vote of any 
board member, or from appointing any senior 
manager? 
Verify FR and shareholders agreements. The score is 0 if the 
answer is no; 1 if answer is yes.  
20. Is the free-float equal or larger than 25%, 
as required by the premium listing segments of 
BM&FBovespa? 
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
 
2.1  Disclosure 
The first CGI dimensions contains six disclosure of information attributes: (i) policies 
and mechanisms to handle conflict of interest and/or related party transactions; (ii) 
compensation, separating the amounts paid to senior management and board members, 
and its variable and fixed components; (iii) unqualified auditor opinion in the last five 
years; (iv) annual report available on the investor relations website; (v) corporate 
presentations available on the company website; and (vi) annual report with a specific 
section dedicated to corporate governance. 
Greater disclosure usually leads to higher firm value and better overall corporate 
governance practices. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) and Klapper and Love (2004) 
show that non-US firms that issue ADRs must comply with requirements that render them 
more transparent. Moreover, weak corporate governance practices are associated with 
more frequent related party transactions (KOHLBECK and MAYHEW, 2010), higher 
executive compensation (HERMALIN and WEISBACH, 1991), and less prestigious external 
auditors (MICHAELY and SHAW, 1995). Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and Black et 
al. (2014) point out that financial disclosure is the dimension of their respective indices 
with the largest impact on shareholder value.  
 
2.2   Board Composition and Functioning 
The second dimension is board composition and functioning. The CGI 
questionnaire addresses five attributes: (i) separation between CEO and Chairman; (ii) 
existence of board committees; (iii) outside directors participation, excluding the CEO; (iv) 
board size between 5 and 11 members; and (v) consecutive board member terms of one 
or two years.  
Yermack (1996) affirms that large boards are less effective than small boards. The 
IBGC suggests an ideal board size of 5 to 11 directors with two-year consecutive terms for 
board members. The presence of outside directors and the separation of CEO and 
Chairman are positively related to firm valuation (ROSENSTEIN and WYATT, 1990, 
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AGRAWAL and KNOEBER, 1996), and the presence of board committees enhances firm 
monitoring (JOHN and SENBET, 1998). 
 
2.3   Ethics and Conflicts of Interest 
There is a vast literature on conflict of interests between controlling and outside 
shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, 2000, 2002), 
Morck et al. (1988) and Claessens et al. (2000, 2002) show that the concentration of 
voting rights and the separation of voting (control) from cash flow (property) rights have a 
negative effect on firm valuation because of the potential expropriation of minority 
shareholders. Sternberg, Leal, and Bortolon (2011) showed that Brazil displays very high 
ownership concentration levels and Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) found evidence 
that the deviation between control and ownership rights proportions destroys shareholder 
value. It must be noted that Brazilian voting (common) shares can only have one vote. 
Multiple votes per share are not allowed. Brazilian preferred shares might have one vote 
each, depending on the company charter. Usually, they do not carry voting rights but offer 
other rights, most commonly a higher dividend than voting shares.  
We use four attributes related to ethics and conflicts of interest in this article: (i) the 
percentage of non-voting shares at less than 20% of the total equity capital; (ii) the 
percentage of voting shares held by controlling shareholders being equal or less than their 
percentage holdings of all shares; (iii) prohibition of loans to the controlling shareholder or 
other related parties; and (iv) waving the previous remittance of documentation or 
adopting the principle of good faith to facilitate shareholder participation in general 
meetings. 
 
2.4   Shareholder Rights 
The shareholder rights dimension contains five attributes: (i) one vote for each share 
or non-voting shares right to vote in high impact decisions, such as incorporations, spin-
offs, and mergers; (ii) mandatory bid rights to minority shareholders beyond what is legally 
required; (iii) no indirect control structure; (iv) shareholders agreements abstention from 
directing or constraining the right to vote of any board member, or from appointing any 
senior manager; and (v) free-float equal or greater than 25%, as required by the premium 
listing segments of BM&FBovespa.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) assert that granting voting and additional rights and 
incentives for minority shareholder participation are good corporate governance practices. 
10 
 
Nenova (2006) reports that firm valuation is higher when the law grants more rights (for 
example, mandatory bid rights) to shareholders. Claessens et al. (2002) and Carvalhal 
(2012) find that indirect ownership structures and shareholder agreements may expropriate 
minority shareholders and are negatively related to firm value. Gelman et al. (2015) assert 
that Brazilian shareholder agreements reduce shareholder value when they contain general 
stipulations that bind the vote of board members to the will of signatories. Moreover, 
liquidity is positively associated with firm value and negatively associated with ownership 
concentration (BECHT, BOLTON, and RÖELL, 2003). 
 
3 – SAMPLE 
 
Our sample consists of firms listed on BM&FBovespa from 2004 to 2013, which 
are, respectively, the first year that the 20-question questionnaire was used and the last 
year available when we concluded the latest scoring in October of 2014 and the writing of 
this article. Most companies file their previous year information with CVM usually between 
April and June and we collect the data during the second semester of the following year. 
Our annual samples do not include companies with incomplete or unavailable 
information, and firms whose shares were not traded in BM&FBovespa during each year.   
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the number of firms per year ranges from 334 to 
404. The sample size varies every year because of IPOs, delistings, mergers and 
acquisitions, and availability of information. The number of firms is higher between 2004 
and 2007 due to the many IPOs in this period. In contrast, the number of firms has 
decreased since 2008, after the international financial crises (subprime and European debt 
crises). 
 
4 – EVOLUTION OF CGI SCORES 
 
4.1  Overall Corporate Governance Practices 
Table 2 shows the average value of the CGI and its four subindices (scaled to a 0-
10 range) from 2004 to 2013. The average CGI score increased from 3.8 in 2004 to 5.8 
in 2013. Conventional mean comparison tests (not reported here) show that these 
differences are statistically significant. The differences from 2004 to 2007 and from 2008 
to 2012, in the hot IPO and the crises years, respectively, are also statistically significant. 
The CGI continued to improve even during the crises years. The creation of Novo 
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Mercado is possibly one of the drivers of these increasing CGI scores because most new 
listings took place in it after 2004. 
Even so corporate governance practices have improved, the average CGI score of 
5.8 out of 10.0 can be considered low because the CGI questionnaire addresses some 
corporate governance practices that are relatively easy to adopt, suggesting that there is 
room for improvement. Taking 2013 as an example, firms score very low in ethics & 
conflicts of interest (3.3) when compared to disclosure (6.6), board composition & 
functioning (6.4), and shareholders rights (6.3). The improvement from 2004 to 2013 was 
larger in disclosure (94% from 3.4 to 6.6), followed by shareholders rights (50% from 4.2 
to 6.3), board composition & functioning (31% from 4.9 to 6.4), and ethics & conflicts of 
interest (22% from 2.7 to 3.3).  
 
Table 2 - Overall Corporate Governance Practices 
The table shows the number of firms in our sample and the average value of the corporate governance index 
(CGI) and its four subsindices, scaled on a 0-10 range, from 2004 to 2013. Disclosure, Board Composition 
& Functioning, Ethics and Conflicts of Interest, and Shareholder Rights are the four CGI subindices. The 
annual samples do not include companies with incomplete or unavailable information, and firms whose 
shares were not traded in BM&FBovespa during each year. CGI is a corporate governance index composed 
of 20 questions that are answered from public information (company filings, charters, and annual reports) 
depicted in Table 1.  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: Sample size           
Number of Firms 378 343 366 404 387 365 344 341 335 334 
New Firms in Sample - 10 54 57 4 23 12 15 11 0 
Firms Leaving Sample - 36 16 26 38 30 20 19 0 1 
Panel B: Averages           
CGI 3.8 3.9 4.4 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.6 5.9 5.9 5.8 
Disclosure 3.4 3.9 4.5 5.0 5.2 5.9 5.9 6.3 6.1 6.6 
Board Composition & 
Functioning 
4.9 5.1 5.3 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.6 6.4 
Ethics and Conflicts of Interest 2.7 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.4 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.3 




Table 3 shows the average value of the CGI and its four subindices by listing 
segment in 2013, the most recent year in the sample. Over 50% of the sample was listed 
in the premium corporate governance segments of BM&FBovespa (38% in Novo Mercado, 
9% in Level 1, and 6% in Level 2). As expected, the average CGI is much higher for firms 
listed in the premium corporate governance segments than in the traditional market. In 




Table 3 - Overall Corporate Governance Practices by Listing Segment 
The table shows the average value of the CGI and its four subsindices (scaled to a 0-10 range) for 334 firms 
in 2013 by listing segment (Novo Mercado, Levels 1 and 2, Traditional and Bovespa Mais). Disclosure, 
Board Composition & Functioning, Ethics and Conflicts of Interest, and Shareholder Rights are the four CGI 
subindices. CGI is a corporate governance index composed of 20 questions that are answered from public 
information (company filings, charters, and annual reports) depicted in Table 1.  
 












CGI 7.7 6.4 5.8 6.1 4.2 5.8 
Disclosure 8.4 8.5 8.3 4.7 4.6 6.6 
Board Composition & 
Functioning 
8.3 8.0 7.5 7.3 4.4 6.4 
Ethics and Conflicts of Interest 5.4 1.1 1.2 5.0 2.3 3.3 
Shareholder Rights 8.3 6.6 4.9 7.3 4.9 6.3 
% of firms 38% 6% 9% 1% 46% 100% 
 
Table 4 shows the average value of the CGI according to firm size ranges (gross 
annual revenue). Around 44% of firms have annual revenues higher than R$ 1 billion. Our 
results suggest a positive relation between firm size and the quality of corporate 
governance practices. This is consistent with many international and Brazilian studies (LEAL 
and CARVALHAL-DA-SILVA, 2007). Table 5 shows the average value of the CGI by 
industry (according to the Economatica database industry classification). Firms are widely 
distributed across industries and none concentrates more than 15% of the sample. The 
industries with more companies are energy (12%) and bank/insurance (10%). The software 
& data, transportation, and mining industries display the highest average CGIs (7.6, 7.1, 
and 7.0, respectively). On the other hand, textile, non-metal minerals, 
telecommunications, and electronics present the lowest CGIs (4.7, 4.8, 4.8, and 4.9, 
respectively). 
 
Table  4 - Overall Corporate Governance Practices by Firm Size 
The table shows the average value of the CGI and its four subsindices (scaled to a 0-10 range) for 334 firms 
in 2013 by firm size ranges (gross annual revenue). Disclosure, Board Composition & Functioning, Ethics 
and Conflicts of Interest, and Shareholder Rights are the four CGI subindices. CGI is a corporate 
governance index composed of 20 questions that are answered from public information (company filings, 
charters, and annual reports) depicted in Table 1.  
 
Annual Revenue (R$) CGI 
% of 
firms 
> 250 million 4.0 23% 
250 to 500 million 5.7 9% 
500 million to 1 billion 6.0 24% 
1 billion to 5 billion 6.7 28% 
5 billion to 10 billion 7.0 9% 
> 10 billion 6.8 7% 
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Table 5 - Overall Corporate Governance Practices by Industry 
The table shows the average value of the CGI and its four subsindices (scaled to a 0-10 range) in 2013 by 
industry (according to Economatica database). Disclosure, Board Composition & Functioning, Ethics and 
Conflicts of Interest, and Shareholder Rights are the four CGI subindices. CGI is a corporate governance 
index composed of 20 questions that are answered from public information (company filings, charters, and 
annual reports) depicted in Table 1.  
 
Sector CGI % of firms 
Agricultural 6.9 1% 
Bank and insurance 6.3 10% 
Chemical 5.2 3% 
Commerce  6.0 5% 
Construction 5.9 6% 
Eletronics 4.9 2% 
Energy 5.7 12% 
Food & beverage 5.9 6% 
Industrial machine 6.0 1% 
Mining 7.0 1% 
Non-metal minerals 4.8 1% 
Oil & gas 6.1 2% 
Others 6.1 24% 
Pulp & paper 5.8 1% 
Software & data 7.6 1% 
Steel & metallurgy 5.1 6% 
Telecomunications 4.8 2% 
Textile 4.7 6% 
Transportation 7.1 4% 
Vehicle & parts 5.0 5% 
 
 
4.2  Specific Corporate Governance Practices  
Table 6 presents the average scores for each one of the 20 questions that make up 
the CGI questionnaire. The following sections analyze each corporate governance practice 
according to the four CGI subindices (disclosure, board composition & functioning, ethics 




Table 6 – Percentage of Companies Scoring “Yes” to Corporate Governance Index Questions  
The table shows the percentage of companies that answer “yes” to each CGI question from 2004 to 2013. All questions are answered from public information 
(company filings, charters, and annual reports) according to the criteria depicted in Table 1.  
Question 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: Disclosure 
1. Does any company public document include information about 
policies and established mechanisms to handle conflict of interest 
situations and/or related party transactions?  
31% 41% 53% 60% 60% 63% 63% 68% 59% 69% 
2. Does the company disclose compensation information for 
senior management and board members, separating the amounts 
paid to management and board, and the variable and fixed 
proportions?  
25% 38% 41% 36% 56% 89% 92% 93% 93% 93% 
3. Did the company present any opinion in the independent 
auditor report in the last five years that was not unqualified?  
67% 69% 74% 78% 79% 84% 83% 83% 83% 84% 
4. Does the company website have an investor relations section 
containing its Annual Report? 
46% 55% 60% 67% 65% 67% 52% 62% 50% 40% 
5. Does the company website contain the presentations made to 
securities analysts?  
28% 31% 40% 48% 48% 53% 56% 64% 63% 65% 
6. Does the Annual Report include a specific section dedicated to 
the implementation of corporate governance principles?  
35% 41% 48% 56% 56% 60% 61% 70% 70% 71% 
Panel B: Board Composition and Functioning 
7. Are the Board of Directors Chair and the CEO different 
persons?  
65% 67% 68% 69% 71% 72% 70% 73% 77% 81% 
8. Does the company have board committees reported in public 
information such as the Corporate Charter, Annual Report, 
website, FR?  
14% 19% 21% 23% 26% 32% 41% 42% 42% 43% 
9. Is the board only made up of outside directors, with the 
exception of the CEO?  
74% 73% 77% 76% 77% 76% 71% 77% 74% 77% 
10. Is the board size between 5 and 11 members, as 
recommended by the IBGC Code of Best Practices?  
57% 60% 63% 68% 66% 70% 76% 75% 76% 76% 
11. Do board members serve consecutive one or two-year terms, 
as recommended by the IBGC Code of Best Practices?  




Panel C: Ethics and Conflicts of Interest 
12. Is the percentage of non-voting shares in total capital less 
than 20%?  
30% 30% 40% 45% 46% 48% 53% 53% 52% 56% 
13. Is the percentage of voting shares of the controlling block 
equal or less than its percentage of all kinds of shares altogether?  
28% 26% 37% 43% 44% 46% 53% 51% 52% 53% 
14. Are loans to the controlling shareholder or other related 
parties prohibited in the company charter or shareholders 
agreement? 
0% 1% 1% 3% 3% 3% 7% 7% 5% 8% 
15. Does the corporate charter facilitate shareholder participation 
in general meetings by not requiring the previous remittance of 
documentation proving the shareholder status and adopting the 
principle of good faith?   
52% 49% 45% 39% 38% 37% 27% 32% 33% 33% 
Panel D: Shareholders Rights 
16. At least one of the affirmatives below is true: 
a) the company concedes one vote to each share, of any kind 
b) the company concedes the right to vote to non-voting shares in 
greater impact decisions 
20% 23% 35% 42% 43% 47% 51% 56% 57% 58% 
17. Does the company grant mandatory bid rights besides what is 
legally required?  
15% 21% 33% 43% 45% 51% 57% 60% 61% 62% 
18. Is the company control direct? 29% 31% 33% 33% 36% 36% 39% 65% 72% 68% 
19. Do shareholders agreements abstain from directing or 
constraining the right to vote of any board member, or from 
appointing any senior manager? 
82% 79% 74% 74% 73% 72% 73% 71% 69% 69% 
20. Is the free-float equal or larger than 25%, as required by the 
premium listing segments of BM&FBovespa? 
68% 70% 72% 75% 76% 79% 66% 62% 64% 64% 





Panel A of Table 6 shows that the percentage of companies that disclose some 
information about policies to handle conflict of interest situations and/or related party 
transactions increased from 31% in 2004 to 69% in 2013. Out of these 69% in 2013, 
46% of companies score 0.5 in this question (disclose some information) and 23% of them 
score 1.0 (disclose substantial information). 
The disclosure of compensation, separating the amounts paid to senior 
management and board members, and the variable and fixed proportions, has increased 
substantially since 2009, when it became mandatory to report it in the FR. Only 25% of 
companies disclosed detailed compensation in 2004, whereas 93% reported it in 2013. In 
2008, the year before mandatory disclosure, this percentage reached 56% of sampled 
companies. It is worth noting that there still are companies that do not disclose the legally 
required information. Most of them probably take advantage of a court injunction secured 
by an organization representing financial executives that claims that senior managers are 
at greater risk of kidnapping if their companies report the maximum compensation, as 
required in the FR (BARROS et al., 2015).   
Most companies present an unqualified opinion from independent auditors in the 
previous five years. There has been improvement in this practice and the percentage of 
firms with unqualified auditor opinion increased from 67% in 2004 to 84% in 2013. Even 
so, the number of companies with qualified auditor opinions seems high at 16% of listed 
companies. 
On average, 55% of listed companies published the annual report on their investor 
relations website in the 2004-2013 period. This number fluctuated throughout the years, 
ranging from 40% in 2013 to 67% in 2009. There is still room for improvement on this 
practice because 60% of the companies did not publish annual reports on their website in 
2013. Some possible reasons for this low number may be: (i) companies do not prepare 
annual reports; (ii) companies prepare annual reports but do not disclose them on the 
website, and (iii) companies disclose annual reports on the website with long delays 
(usually we collect the data to score the CGI after 6 to 10 months of each year-end). 
Many companies (65% in 2013) disclose presentations made to securities analysts 
on their website. Only 28% of companies disclosed corporate presentations on their 
website in 2004. There should be room for improvement because companies that list their 
shares on BM&FBovespa should meet regularly with market analysts. The annual reports of 
most firms include a specific section dedicated to the implementation of corporate 
governance principles. The number in 2013 (71% of listed companies) is significantly 
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higher than in 2004 (35% of companies), demonstrating a major improvement on this 
practice over time.  
 
4.2.2 Board Composition and Functioning 
The Chairman of the Board and the CEO are not the same person in most 
companies (65% of companies in 2004 and 81% in 2013) according to Panel B of Table 
6. During the 2004-2013 period, an average of 70% of companies had different people 
as Chairman and CEO, and there was an increase over the years, especially after 2011, 
when this rule became mandatory for companies listed on Novo Mercado and Levels 1 
and 2. Even though this figure has always been relatively high in the period, this does not 
necessarily mean that companies have professional management. It is customary that the 
most powerful person in the company, the largest shareholder, prefers to be at the board 
and maybe have a professional or younger family member as CEO, as suggested by Pinto 
and Leal (2013).  
The use of board committees (audit, compensation, strategy, corporate 
governance, etc.) still seems low in Brazil. Even though the number of companies with 
board committees increased over time (14% in 2004 to 43% in 2013), almost 60% of 
listed companies do not display committees. The absence of formally constituted 
committees may suggest a certain lack of board structure and sophistication in Brazil. The 
largest shareholders may still dominate boards. Table 7 details the presence of board 
committees in Brazil, as declared by companies in their public documentation. The most 
frequent board committee is human resources/compensation/evaluation (30%), followed 
by audit (29%), finance/tax/investment (16%), risk/internal control/compliance (12%), 
strategy (12%), and governance (9%).  
 
Table 7 - Presence of Board Committes in Brazil 
The table shows the percentage of companies that declared board committees (audit, compensation, 
strategy, corporate governance, etc) from 2004 to 2013.  
 
Board Committee Type 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Human Resources, 
Compensation, or Evaluation  
4% 7% 8% 12% 14% 19% 23% 26% 29% 30% 
Audit 9% 14% 13% 14% 17% 21% 23% 27% 28% 29% 
Finance,  Tax, or Investment 4% 6% 5% 5% 7% 10% 17% 14% 17% 16% 
Risk, Internal Control, or 
Compliance 
2% 4% 3% 4% 5% 9% 13% 12% 11% 12% 
Governance 1% 2% 3% 3% 5% 8% 9% 10% 10% 9% 




Panel B of Table 6 shows that outside directors comprise most boards (77%) if the 
CEO is not considered. The percentage of companies with outside directors is relatively 
stable over time, ranging from 71% in 2010 to 77% in 2013. At first glance, this number 
may seem surprisingly high in a country where controlling shareholders have the power to 
indicate senior management, but maybe this is the reason why major shareholders prefer 
to nominate boards with trusted people outside the executive team, including other family 
and control coalition members. It is important to note that we are not analyzing the 
presence of independent board members, but their proportion is still low, as indicated by 
Brugni et al. (2013). Moreover, when our CGI design and data collection initiated, 
companies did not identify directors as independent.  
Board sizes between 5 and 11 members are very common (76% of the firms in 
2013). The percentage of companies with adequate board size increased from 57% in 
2004 to 76% in 2013. Besides the improvement on this practice, this increase is also due 
to changes in the scoring criteria for this question. The revised IBGC Code of Best 
Practices increased the maximum recommended board size from 9 to 11 in 2009 and the 
questionnaire scoring criteria changed accordingly.  
Nowadays, board members usually serve consecutive one or two-year terms. In 
2004, only 35% of companies had board terms according to IBGC rules, but the 
frequency increased to 81% in 2013. The IBGC Code of Best Practices recommended 
consecutive board terms of 1 year before 2009. The 2009 revised code increased the 
recommended term to 2 years. The break in the series in 2007 is due to a change in the 
scoring criteria implemented by request of IBGC even before they changed their code.  
 
4.2.3 Ethics and Conflicts of Interest 
The use of control enhancement mechanism such as non-voting shares and the 
deviation between control and ownership rights has decreased in Brazil, as Sternberg et al. 
(2011) pointed out, and is a remarkable improvement. Even so, our results show a high 
degree of voting concentration and a considerable difference between the percentage of 
voting and total equity capital held by large shareholders, consistently with Leal and 
Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and Sternberg et al. (2011), among others. Even though there 
still are many companies with non-voting shares, there was a substantial increase in the 
proportion of companies with less than 20% of non-voting shares in their equity capital. 
This percentage went from 30% of companies in 2004 to 56% in 2013 but stabilized after 
2010. Most new listings joined Novo Mercado after 2004, which bars non-voting shares, 
but new issues dwindled after 2010. Only 28% of companies exhibited controlling 
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shareholders with ownership percentages of the voting capital equal or less than their 
percentage in the total equity capital in 2004. This figure increased considerably to 53% 
by 2013.  
On the other hand, forbidding loans to controlling shareholders or related parties is 
rare among Brazilian companies. Only 8% of them do so in their charter or shareholders 
agreement. Despite a small improvement in recent years, this is, by far, the corporate 
governance practice with the lower percentage of adopting companies in the CGI 
questionnaire and an aspect that needs improvement.  
Most Brazilian listed companies do not facilitate shareholder participation in 
general meetings and there is much bureaucracy. Only one third of the companies did not 
require previous remittance of documentation to confirm the shareholder status and/or 
adopt the principle of good faith. Out of the 33% of companies that facilitated the voting 
process in 2013, only 1% displayed both practices (no need to send documentation and 
adoption of good faith). This is another area that needs refining.  
 
4.2.4 Shareholder Rights 
The proportion of companies with voting shares only in their equity capital or that 
grant voting rights to non-voting shares in special circumstances (incorporation, spin-off, 
merger, contracts between the company and related parties) increased considerably from 
20% in 2004 to 58% in 2013. This is a remarkable departure from a market dominated 
by non-voting shares before the new listings wave in Novo Mercado. Exclusive issuance of 
voting shares (49% in 2013) is more common than granting voting rights to non-voting 
shares (9% in 2013). 
The number of companies granting mandatory bid rights besides what is legally 
required has increased considerably in recent years. The Brazilian securities law requires 
that acquirers pay 80% of the bid made for the controlling bloc to voting minority 
shareholders. Non-voting shareholders do not enjoy this legal right. Extra bid rights 
include a percentage greater than 80% of the bid for the controlling bloc for minority 
voting shareholders and/or extending this right, at any percentage, to non-voting 
shareholders. Only 15% of companies granted extra mandatory bid rights in 2004. This 
number increased to 62% in 2013. Most importantly, there was a substantial increase in 
the companies granting mandatory bid rights to all shares. A mere 8% (out of 15%) of 
companies granted mandatory bid rights to all shares in 2004, whereas 60% (out of 62%) 
granted these rights to all shares in 2013.  
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Indirect control structures may be used to separate control from ownership rights in 
addition to using non-voting shares, as discussed in Aldrighi and Postali (2011) and 
Bortolon (2013). The percentage of Brazilian listed companies with no indirect control 
structure increased from 29% in 2004 to 68% in 2013. A change in the scoring criterion 
for this question caused a break in this series in 2011. Companies scored “0” if they had 
any type of indirect control structure before 2011. After 2011, companies scored “0” only 
if they had an indirect control structure that was used to enhance control. For example, a 
company would score 1 if it had an indirect structure in which the controlling shareholder 
kept the same voting power directly and indirectly. In this case, the indirect structure was 
used to enhance control rights in detriment of ownership rights.  
The use of shareholders agreements is common in Brazil and is another way to 
enhance control rights because they may contain provisions that restrict the voting rights of 
shareholders and board members that represent their signatories and determine the way 
controlling shareholders allocate board seats (GELMAN, CASTRO, and SEIDLER, 2015; 
CARVALHAL, 2012; STERNBERG et al., 2011; BIANCHI et al., 2001). The percentage of 
companies with shareholders agreements that abstain from directing or constraining the 
right to vote of any board member, or from appointing any senior manager, decreased 
from 82% in 2004 to 69% in 2013. This practice has not improved over time. Firms are 
using more shareholder agreements to govern the relation between shareholders possibly 
as a consequence of the reduction of ownership concentration since 2004 pointed out by 
Sternberg et al. (2011), among others.  
An acceptable level of market liquidity is very important to minority investors. Novo 
Mercado requires a free-float equal or greater than 25%. Most companies listed in the 
traditional segment of the exchange may offer inadequate liquidity. On average, 70% the 
companies had this minimum free-float between 2004 and 2013. This percentage did not 
change significantly over the years, ranging from 62% in 2011 to 79% in 2009.  
 
4.2.5 Other Corporate Governance Practices 
We scored four additional corporate governance practices that are not part of the 
CGI questionnaire. They are the number of board meetings per year, the existence of a 
policy on insider stock trading, the presence of poison pills, and the disclosure of the 
minimum, average, and maximum of individual senior management and board 
compensation. This information became available from 2009 with the introduction of the 
FR. Table 8 shows the evolution of these four corporate governance practices up to 2013.  
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The IBGC Code of Best Practices recommends 4 to 12 board meetings per year. 
On average, 73% of the listed companies comply with this standard. Specifically, 43% of 
the companies hold 4 or 5 board meetings per year and 30% from 6 to 12 meetings per 
year.  
The disclosure of the company policy on insider stock trading increased 
considerably after BM&FBovespa required that all companies listed on Novo Mercado, 
Levels 1 and 2 publish them together with codes of conduct in 2011. The disclosure of this 
policy as well as the stock trades by corporate insiders and controlling shareholders are 
considered good corporate governance practices. The percentage of companies disclosing 
a policy on insider stock trading increased from 56% in 2009 to 68% in 2011 and 74% in 
2013.  
Poison pills are important takeover defense mechanisms (SCHWERT, 2000; FIELD 
and KARPOFF, 2002). The percentage of companies that do not have poison pills is 
relatively stable over time, ranging from 80% in 2010 to 86% in 2013. Brazilian poison 
pills are not like US poison pills. They usually refer to the inclusion of a mandatory bid 
right in the charter that requires the acquirer of company stock to bid for all the remaining 
stocks beyond a certain threshold (commonly 20 to 30%). The charter may define the 
minimum bid, such as 150% of the current market price, and the conditions for poison pill 
removal, sometimes also requiring a mandatory bid for all shares from those willing to 
remove this charter provision. 
CVM does not require the disclosure of individual compensation. Instead, 
companies must report the average, minimum, and maximum individual compensation of 
senior managers and board members on the FR. Even though the frequency of companies 
reporting this information has increased from 63% in 2009 to 72% in 2013, 28% of the 
listed companies in Brazil did not follow this CVM rule in 2013. The most likely reason is 
that they avail themselves of a court injunction in order to avoid the publication of the 




Table 8 - Companies Scoring “Yes” in Other Corporate Governance Practices 
The table shows the percentage of companies that scorer “yes” to four additional corporate governance 
practices that are not included in the CGI questionnaire: number of board meetings; policy on stock trading; 
presence of poison pills; and disclosure of the minimum, average and, maximum of individual senior 
management and board compensations. These scores are available from 2009 to 2013. All questions are 
answered from public information (company filings, charters, and annual reports).   
 
Practice 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number of board meetings between 4 and 12 per year 71% 72% 72% 71% 73% 
Disclosure of policy on stock trading 56% 56% 68% 71% 74% 
No poison pill 84% 80% 85% 85% 86% 
Disclosure of minimum, average, and maximum 
compensation 
63% 72% 75% 76% 72% 
 
 
5 - CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this article was to analyze the evolution of the quality of Brazilian 
corporate governance practices gauged through a company-level index from 2004 to 
2013. The corporate governance index (CGI) contemplates several corporate governance 
and disclosure attributes, which are not legally required but considered good practices by 
international and Brazilian standards. The CGI score is attained by means of a 20-
question questionnaire.  
The CGI is much higher for firms listed on premium listing segments (Novo 
Mercado, Levels 1 and 2, and Bovespa Mais) of the stock exchange, which demand that 
companies that voluntarily join them adopt certain corporate governance and disclosure 
practices in addition to what is legally required. There is also a positive relation between 
firm size and the quality of their corporate governance practices. Moreover, our results 
show that software & data, transportation, and mining are the industries with the best 
corporate governance practices, whereas textiles, non-metal minerals, 
telecommunications, and electronics present the lowest CGI scores. 
The overall quality of corporate governance practices in Brazil has improved since 
2004. However, the average scores of the CGI and its four subindices are still relatively 
low and may improve even further. Company scores are very low in the ethics & conflicts 
of interest subindice if compared to the disclosure, board composition & functioning, and 
shareholders rights subindices.  
We also offer an analysis of the CGI evolution according to each individual 
question in the questionnaire used for scoring. Companies improved in several aspects 
under the disclosure group of questions. This may be due to new listings in Novo Mercado 
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as well as the new disclosure regulation introduced in 2009. There was also an evolution 
in some board practices, notably in the number of board members within the 5 to 9 range, 
but the use of committees is still relatively low. Seventy-three percent of the companies 
hold between 4 and 12 board meetings per year. The new Novo Mercado listings 
contributed to a remarkable reduction in the percentage of non-voting shares in the equity 
capital and in the difference between control and ownership rights held by the largest 
shareholders. On the other hand, the number of companies that explicitly forbade loans to 
related parties and reduced formalities to facilitate participation in shareholder meetings is 
still small are aspects that need improvement. Finally, even though the number of 
companies that grant extra mandatory bid rights in favor of minority shareholders 
increased and the use of indirect control structures decreased, major shareholders 
leveraged their control rights by means of greater use of shareholder agreements that 
interfere in board member nomination and independent voting. Thus, as some control 
enhancement mechanisms receded, this one became more common.  
Most companies disclose their policy about insider stock trading and do not have 
poison pills in their charter. Yet, some companies rebelled against the regulation requiring 
disclosing the maximum individual compensation among senior managers and directors. 
Twenty-eight percent of them did not report detailed compensation information. Most 
probably shielded by a court injunction in which the plaintiffs claim that they are at a 
greater risk of kidnapping if they comply with this rule.  
This analysis contributes with a portrait of several Brazilian corporate governance 
aspects from the year the first IPO in Novo Mercado (2004), through the IPO wave years 
(2004-2007), and the international crises years (2008-2013). It offers some insights on 
what advanced as well as highlights some areas that need more attention. This article also 
offers many recent references to recent research about Brazilian corporate governance 
practices.  
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